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Abstract
Patent trolls have changed the innovation and patent policy landscape. This thesis
is an empirical event study that focuses on two landmark cases of patent troll litigation,
RIM v. NTP and eBay v. Mercexchange, to determine whether pro-troll litigation
outcomes significantly impact the market values of the firms in the high-tech industries
they target. I find that the Supreme Court ruling in eBay v. Mercexchange did seem to
significantly impact a proportion of firms in the market. The decisive factors in
distinguishing affected vs. unaffected firms include a firm‟s R&D to Sales ratio, market
value, and NAICS code specification.
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Introduction
Since their appearance in the 1990s, patent trolls have created a new dimension in
the patent litigation landscape. Patent trolls are a subset of firms called non-practicing
entities (NPEs), or firms that innovate and patent but that do not engage in the
manufacturing process, such as research universities (Abril and Plant 2007). Patent troll
firms in particular are NPEs that amass patent portfolios for the sole purpose of patent
infringement litigation to extract costly licensing fees or large monetary damages from
firms that may be infringing on a troll-owned patent (Abril and Plant 2007). Patent trolls
have restricted their historical operations to firms in the technology and
telecommunications industries (Allison, Lemley, and Walker 2011). Their antics have
caused a significant degree of media controversy.
Critics of patent trolls have argued that they slow innovation by tying up company
resources that could otherwise be used to research new products with costly lawsuits.
(Abril and Plant 2007; Shrestha 2010; Federal Trade Commission 2003). Critics also
argue that they exacerbate hold-up problems from delaying the production of a good
whose patent is in dispute. This causes harm to the consumer in several ways. Delaying
the production of a good via litigation (or the threat of litigation) may result in higher
royalties paid by the defendant firm, or even royalties paid on improperly granted patents,
resulting in higher prices to consumers and deadweight loss (FTC 2003). Companies may
also choose to limit their product offering to avoid litigation and hold-up problems (FTC
2003). In response, patent troll defenders argue that the patent troll firms constitute the
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next level of patent market evolution, acting as market-makers who also provide capital
and bargaining power to independent investors and small businesses (McDonough 2006).
In either case, the emergence of patent trolls has significant implications for the
demand for patent system reform in the U.S., as new legislation will now have to account
for these new players in the marketplace. Furthermore, the impact of patent trolls on
innovation and competition, especially in the hi-tech industry where they mostly operate,
is an area of interest for future research.
The success of patent troll litigation has increased significantly in the 21st century,
and in recent years there has been an upsurge in empirical research conducted on patent
troll behavior, their impact on the industries they prey upon, their impact on innovation
and the patent landscape, and their impact on specific companies within relevant
industries. However, thus far I have found no publications on the subject of patent trolls
in economics journals, only in law reviews. This may be in part due to the lack of data on
patent troll firms, which are predominantly private firms, the lack of data on the firms‟
patent portfolios, the contents of which are kept highly secret by their owners, and the
difficulty of accessing patent litigation data over time and across industries. In order to
bypass these problems, my thesis focuses on stock prices of litigant firms. My thesis
seeks to examine the effect of patent trolls on firms in the technology and
telecommunications industry by analyzing whether the success of patent troll litigation in
landmark cases impacts the market value of firms in the same industry as their litigants.
The two cases I examine are the RIM v. NTP case and the eBay v. Mercexchange case.
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The relevant litigation outcome dates I examine in this thesis are August 5, 2003, and
May 15, 2006, respectively.
In Part I, I present background research on patent trolls in the existing literature,
which thus far has been more theoretical in focus. In Part II, I describe my methodology.
I conduct event studies on key dates of the announcement of successful patent troll
litigation outcomes and analyze changes in stock price in a range of 3-5 days surrounding
the time of the announcement to see if company stock price changes significantly in
response to patent troll success or failure. I describe my data in Part III. This consists of
daily stock price data, as well as data on annual research and development (R&D)
expenses, net sales/turnover, and market value, for a portfolio of firms created using
existing U.S. exchange-listed technology stock indices, as well as databases of firms with
similar NAICS codes to patent troll litigants in the cases I examine. In Part IV, I discuss
my results. I find that there are no statistically significant results for the RIM v. NTP
outcome that support my hypothesis. This may be explained by the usage of the wrong
date, the lack of information regarding patent trolls in the market, or the lack of
significance of the outcome event to investors in the market. The eBay v. Mercexchange
does seem to have had a statistically significant result on 64% of firms in my sample
portfolio. Further analyses of individual firm abnormal returns showed that R&D to Sales
ratios, market values, and NAICS code specifications are significant factors in
distinguishing firms who are and are not affected by patent troll litigation success in
landmark cases.
I.

Literature Review
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The existing literature on patent trolls stems largely from law reviews and law
journals. They can be divided into four major topic areas: patent law and court rulings
regarding patent troll activity (Magliocca 2007; Shrestha 2010; Diessel 2007), the actual
and potential industries patent trolls target and why that is the case (FTC 2003; Allison et
al. 2011; Allison, Lemley, and Walker 2009; Shrestha 2010), the effects (whether
beneficial or detrimental) of patent trolls (or NPEs) (FTC 2003; Shrestha 2010;
McDonough 2006; Reitzig, Henkel and Heath 2007; Magliocca 2007), and empirical
studies of whether patent trolling is effective and/or valuable (Allison et al. 2011; Allison
et al. 2009). Thus far, I have found no studies conducted on the effect of patent trolls
from the market‟s perspective.
The legal studies on patent trolls concentrate on two landmark cases in the early
21st century. The first case effectively put the phenomenon of patent trolls on the map in
2001, when NTP Inc., a small patent troll firm in Virginia, sued Research in Motion
(RIM), the maker of the Blackberry device, for infringement on several patents
(Magliocca 2007). NTP won the case at the district level on August 5, 2003, when the
court ordered RIM to pay $53.7 mil in damages and granted NTP a permanent injunction
in the infringed-upon patents on email technology (Magliocca 2007). RIM appealed but
was ultimately unsuccessful in lifting the injunction, which led it to settle with NTP with
an agreement to pay NTP $612.5 mil in exchange for licensing fees in 2006 (Magliocca
2007). The NTP v. RIM case set a significant legal precedent for the success of patent
trolls in utilizing injunctions to sue for exorbitantly large licensing fees (given that case
law at this time allowed for plaintiffs to set their own unlimited “reasonable royalty
rate”); academics argue that this case is a classic example of how patent trolls stifle
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innovation and have a parasitic influence on the patent economy (Magliocca 2007,
Shrestha 2010). The second landmark case in the history of patent trolls is the 2006 eBay
v. Mercexchange case, where patent troll Mercexchange sued eBay for the infringement
of patents in its online auction patent portfolio. Mercexchange won its case on the district
level but was unable to secure an injunction, leading it to appeal—ultimately the case
reached the Supreme Court, which gave a four factor test in determining whether an
injunction was to be issued (Diessel 2007). The Court overturned the Federal Circuit‟s
ruling that injunctions should always be issued for patent infringement, but failed to
support the district court‟s ruling that injunctions should not be granted to firms that do
not put the litigated patent into practice (Diessel 2007, Magliocca 2007). The Supreme
Court ruled in favor of the patent trolls on May 15, 2006 by failing to set a legal
precedent in favor of granting injunctions based upon a “market competition
requirement”, or the requirement that a firm manufacture a product for competition in the
market based upon the litigated patent (Diessel 2007; Magliocca 2007). Diessel notes
however that despite this, courts at the district level have adopted the market competition
requirement for granting injunctions in the post-eBay environment (2007).
Based upon surveys of patent infringement cases, studies confirm that previous
patent troll activity has been restricted to the telecommunications, software, and other
such high-tech industries (Allison et al. 2009, Shrestha 2010, Allison et al. 2011; FTC
2003). According to a 2003 FTC report, the drivers of innovation in high-tech industries
are competition, patenting, and trade secrecy. Industry specialists agree that the main
reasons to patent are to prevent free riding, to negotiate cross-licenses (to enable followon innovation), to ensure smooth operations, and to generate revenue via licensing fees
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(FTC 2003). Others note that patents, especially on software and business methods, may
actually hinder innovation and competition by increasing barriers to entry and introduce
the threat of inadvertent patent infringement (FTC 2003).
The main arguments against the practice of patent trolls are that they decrease
innovation by wasting resources with frivolous litigation, that they increase the cost of
products by charging manufacturers licensing fees, and that they worsen the patent
thicket problem (Shrestha 2010; FTC 2003). The patent thickets problem describes the
extremely complex and overlapping web of intellectual property rights and claims that
makes up the current US patent system (FTC 2003). One of the main criticisms of patent
trolls is that they tie up company resources with “bad faith” litigation based upon
relatively valueless patents in an attempt to extract licensing fees (Shrestha 2010; FTC
2003; Magliocca 2007). Shrestha argues that this is questionable given the extremely
high sunk costs to mounting a litigation suit (plaintiffs require approximately $2 mil in
upfront costs), and that furthermore NPEs tend to own extremely valuable foundational
patents that underlie the production of goods across industries and product lines, thus
justifying the charge of licensing fees (2010). Critics of patent trolls also claim that they
cause hold-up problems by delaying production of a disputed patented good via legal
injunctions. This may increase the cost of products or result in a more limited product
offering for consumers (FTC 2003). For firms, this may result in inefficiency in that
defendant firms are pressured to pay off potentially higher royalty fees to continue
production, or to pay licensing fees on potentially irrelevant patents in order to avoid
litigation costs (FTC 2003). Critics of patent trolls argue that they unnecessarily
complicate the patent thicket problem by further fragmenting the distribution of patent
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rights, thus leading to higher prices, lower demand, and a net reduction of overall welfare
(FTC 2003). This however, is not a patent-troll specific problem; instead it is a problem
that arises out of the current US patent structure (Shrestha 2010).
While most see patent trolls as parasites that play off of the problems of the US
patent system, some have argued that they serve an important purpose in the patent
economy. McDonough argues that patent trolls “act as a market intermediary in the
patent market…provide liquidity, market clearing, and increased efficiency to the patent
markets” (McDonough 2006, p. 190; Shrestha 2010). According to McDonough, patent
trolls provide an important role in the secondary market for patents by buying patents
from inventors, thus providing valuation services for patent-holders who would otherwise
have no conception of the worth of their patents (2006; Shrestha 2010). However, there is
no incentive for patent trolls to provide the correct valuation information to independent
inventors and small business patent-owners if they can quote a lower price to purchase
the patents at a discount. McDonough also argues that patent trolls can help mediate
patent purchasing between the independent investors and small businesses that create
patents, and the large businesses that benefit from patent technology (2006). Patent troll
firms help smaller firms who do not have the resources to protect against patent
infringement to pursue litigation and secure licensing fees in court (McDonough 2006).
However, for every valid patent infringement suit brought against a target firm, there are
potentially an equal or greater number of baseless suits filed against firms who would
rather pay a royalty fee than deal with costly litigation. Finally, McDonough argues that
patent troll firms can act as “patent dealers” who turn the patent market into a
“centralized „dealer‟ market” akin to the NASDAQ, where dealers “hold a patent
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inventory and attempt to license to companies seeking a specific technology”, leading to
the increased liquidity of patents as commodities (2006, p. 214). However, McDonough
overlooks the fact that patent trolls are not incentivized to seek out companies who want
their patents and offer them licensing options (because then the potential infringer could
switch to an alternative non-patented technology) (FTC 2003). Instead, patent troll firms
are incentivized to spring surprise litigation suits (or at least the threat of one) to obtain
higher licensing fees (FTC 2003). In fact, Reitzig creates a game theoretic model of
patent troll behavior and finds that under the current patent law, the dominant strategy for
trolling firms is “being infringed” (2007, p. 150).
There have been several empirical studies on the success and effectiveness of
patent trolls that seek to confirm or deny criticisms of the effect of patent trolls on
innovation. Among these have been studies on the most litigated (and most valuable)
patents and the characteristics of their litigation and settlement processes, as well as the
characteristics of their holders. There is some disagreement in regards to whether patent
trolls are effective litigants or not. Allison et al found in 2009 that the majority of the
most-litigated and most valuable patents are held by NPEs, discrediting the claim that
patent trolls waste resources by frivolously pressing lawsuits with weak patents. In 2011,
however, the same group of researchers found that repeat patent plaintiffs (mainly patent
trolls) are more likely to settle, but that when they do go to trial, they overwhelmingly
lose. This stands in contrast to the findings of Shrestha in 2010, which claimed that many
NPEs hold high value patents and do not engage in frivolous litigation, and also
suggested that NPEs can serve a “valuable role in enhancing innovation by identifying
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and acquiring high value patents and thereby funding and encouraging some of the most
successful inventors” (p. 128).
II.

Theory
To approach the problem of how patent trolls affect the market value of firms in

the industries they target, I conduct a series of event studies. The legal literature provides
two major events, or two major litigation outcomes, in the history of patent troll
litigation, that seem to be turning points in the relative success of patent troll litigation.
These are the NTP v. RIM and eBay v. Mercexchange cases. Because these cases have
had multiple appeals and court rulings, there are several options in terms of dates to test
for statistical significance. These include August 5, 2003, which is the first unexpected
pro-troll outcome of the NTP v. RIM case, and May 15, 2006, which is the pro-troll
Supreme Court ruling in the eBay v. Mercexchange case. In general, I expect that rulings
in favor of patent trolls for injunctions and/or large royalty fees should have a negative
impact on the market value (measured by stock price) of the defendant technology firm,
as well as other firms in a similar industry. In order to test this hypothesis, I will conduct
event studies on the abovementioned case dates to determine whether litigation outcomes
significantly impact market value of potential targets for future troll litigation. The
methodology for my event studies is derived from Filson and Oweis (2010), which is
based on the original event study methodology work by MacKinlay (1997).
First, I construct a portfolio of firms in the industries that patent trolls target. This
general portfolio is broken down by NAICS code in the industries of
telecommunications, software, and electronics manufacturing, among others. The NAICS
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code specifications are based upon the primary NAICS codes of eBay and RIM—I expect
that the more closely the portfolio firms approximate the business of the defendant firm
in patent troll litigation firms, the more that litigation outcomes will impact their market
values. Next, I collect data on the daily returns of the stock prices of the member firms,
and calculate the average daily return of the firms for each portfolio (this assumes that the
returns of all member firms are weighted equally) (Filson and Oweis 2010). I then
estimate a factor model using 250 trading days that end 10 days prior to the event to
prevent information leakage contamination (Filson and Oweis 2010). The factor model I
use is:
(

)

Eqn. 1
where Rit is the daily return of portfolio i on day t, Rft is the daily risk-free rate of return
(as approximated by 1-month Treasury Bills), αi is a parameter, Rmt is the daily return on
the value-weighted market index calculated by the Center for Research on Securities
Prices (CRSP), and εit is the residual, or the “abnormal return” of interest in this case
(Filson and Oweis 2010). All data is found from Wharton Research Data Services
(WRDS).
Filson and Oweis 2010 note that factor models can include additional factors that
assess whether the event effects observed by the market model might be explained by
“sources of risk left uncaptured by the market model” (p. 581). These additional factors
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are the Fama-French factors and momentum. I have included these in creating a second
factor model:
(

)
Eqn. 2

The additional variables are: γ1, γ2, and γ3 as parameters, SMBt and HMLt as the FamaFrench factors (Fama and French, 1993, 1996), and UMDt as the momentum factor
(Carhart, 1997). Data for these variables were also found on WRDS.
Using the coefficients of the estimated factor model and the data surrounding
event date (with a range of up to 3 days prior and after the event date), I compute the
OLS residuals to estimate the abnormal returns for the days surrounding each litigation
outcome (Filson and Oweis 2010; MacKinlay 1997). The “cumulative abnormal returns”
(CARs) are found by taking the sum of the OLS residuals across the days surrounding the
event in question. A positive CAR indicates that the event resulted in a daily return above
what is normally expected, and vice versa for a negative return. I expect pro-plaintiff
litigation outcomes to have negative CARs and pro-defendant litigation outcomes to have
positive CARs.
Since there are timing issues with event dates and the flow of information to the
market, I test a range of windows around the event date in question. I look for CARs
specifically on the event date itself, with a range of 1 day after the event date, with a
range of 1 day before and after the event date, and with a range of 3 days before and after
the event date (Filson and Oweis 2010; MacKinlay 1997). There may be other
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confounding variables that cause the CARs I observe in my study, such as other
important company or industry events happening at or around my event dates of interest.
After conducting a preliminary search using the term “technology” through the Business
Wire press releases from Lexis-Nexis newswires on my litigation outcome dates, I find no
major confounding events. However, as Filson and Oweis note, the overall impact of
these events is impossible to assess (2010).
In order to examine the specific characteristics of firms impacted by litigation
outcome events, I also examine of annual company R&D expense, net sales/turnover, and
market value. I use the first two variables to calculate R&D to Sales ratios for each firm
in my portfolio. This is utilized to more accurately portray the amount of R&D
expenditure of the firm while accounting for variations in firm size. The R&D to Sales
ratio is used as a proxy for the value of a firm‟s patent portfolio (private information),
and can be used to determine whether firms that rely more on R&D to remain
competitive are more susceptible to patent infringement litigation outcomes. This
assumes that firms who engage more in R&D spending will tend to have more valuable
patent portfolios (which would not be the case if the firm decided to keep their findings
as trade secrets). Market value is included as an independent variable to test whether firm
size is relevant to whether a firm is adversely affected by pro-troll case outcomes. I
hypothesize that smaller firms will be more easily affected by the events in this case,
because they have less resources to devote to costly legal battles and are more likely to
pay royalty fees to trolls if litigated against in the future. I also hypothesize that firms
with higher R&D to Sales ratios will be more adversely affected by the pro-troll litigation
outcomes, because firms who engage more in R&D and who presumably rely more on
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their patents are more likely to be targeted by patent trolls and experience hold-up
problems and other associated problems discussed above (see Part II).
III.

Data Description
My initial portfolio consists of U.S.-based technology firms that operate in the

same industries as target firms for patent trolls during two test periods around the
litigation outcome dates of the eBay v. Mercexchange and RIM v. NTP cases. This covers
the years 2002-2003 and 2005-2006. This aggregate list consists of companies with
similar Primary NAICS codes as RIM and eBay, 334220 (Radio and Television
Broadcasting and Wireless Communications Equipment Manufacturing) and 454111
(Electronic Shopping) respectively. This portfolio also includes companies whose
Primary NAICS codes match the Secondary NAICS codes for RIM and eBay. EBay has
no Secondary NAICS code, but RIM has the following relevant codes: 423690 (Other
Electronic Parts and Equipment Merchant Wholesalers), 511210 (Software Publishers),
and 541511 (Custom Computer Programming Services). The portfolio also includes firms
in the Mergent Online IT and Telecommunications Sector specification, as well as firms
in the following technology stock indexes: the Nasdaq Computer Stock Index (IXCO),
the Nasdaq Telecommunications Stock Index (IXTC), the Nasdaq 100 Technology Stock
Index (NDXT), and the S&P 500 Technology Sector Index (IXS). After filtering these
firms through the CRSP database to retain only the firms with available data during the
event study dates, I am left with 412 firms to test for the RIM v. NTP case, and 443 firms
to test for the eBay v. Mercexchange case. See Tables 1 and 2 for summary statistics of
portfolios and litigated firms.
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In order to examine the characteristics of firms impacted by litigation outcome
events, I also collect data from the Compustat database in regards to each company‟s
annual R&D expense, net sales/turnover, and market value for the most recent fiscal year
before the litigation outcome takes place. I use the first two variables to calculate R&D to
Sales ratios for each firm in my portfolio. See Tables 3 and 4 for summary statistics of
portfolios and litigated firms.
IV.

Results
After creating the appropriate factor models and finding CARs over a 7 day range

for the relevant litigation dates of RIM v. NTP and eBay v. Mercexchange, I find that
none of the CARs for the litigated companies are statistically significant to the 5% (or
even 10%) level, meaning that I cannot reject the null hypothesis that the events have no
impact (see Tables 5 and 6). Similar results hold after finding factor models and CARs
for the general portfolios. Columns 1 and 2 correspond to the equations cited above from
MacKinlay and Filson and Oweis (1997; 2010). According to results on the litigated firm
level, the impact of patent troll litigation outcomes appear to be economically significant,
but these impacts may be due to factors not captured by the traditional model used.
However, as predicted, for both cases where the patent troll was victorious, the CARs of
the litigated companies were negative on the day of the litigation outcome announcement,
and in the 1-2 day range after the announcement. Furthermore, in the case of the RIM v.
NTP outcome, the litigated firm‟s [0,0] CAR dropped 56% to -.017 after expanding the
date range to [0,1], indicating that information about litigation outcome may have taken
time to reach investors such that the impact of the case is seen more on the trading day
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after the court‟s verdict. In general, [0,1] CARs are lower than [0,0] CARs, supporting
the hypothesis that the full effects of the event are not experienced until the trading day
after its initial announcement, in order to account for the time taken for information to
disseminate to investors. As MacKinlay notes, this is to be expected (1997; Filson and
Oweis 2010). In any case, it is unclear whether these statistically insignificant results are
due to successful patent troll litigation activity, to some other confounding event in the
industry, or due to noise in the stock price data.
To assess the significance of individual CARs, I follow the approach given by
MacKinlay and Filson and Oweis (1997; 2010). I first find the variance of the OLS
residuals during the estimation window, in order to find the variance of daily abnormal
returns during the 7 day event window under the null (MacKinlay 1997; Filson and
Oweis 2010). The variance of the CARs is computed by “multiplying the estimated
variance of daily abnormal returns by the number of days included in the CAR” window
(Filson and Oweis 2010, p. 581). Examining residual plots does not reveal significant
evidence of heteroskedasticity. The residuals of the factor models show little evidence of
autocorrelation. Pair-wise correlation matrices in Excel do not indicate correlation
between independent variables of over ±.70 (in fact most are under ±.50).
Next, I perform sign tests to see if successful patent troll litigation outcomes have
a significant overall negative impact on the stock prices of the firms they target by
assessing the impacts of the events on each individual firm in the portfolio. This is done
by calculating the CARs for all firms in a given portfolio and examining them to see if a
significant percentage of the CARs are negative, as theory predicts. To perform sign-
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testing, I use the simplified factor model (Eqn. 1) for the portfolio of 412 firms for the
RIM v. NTP case, and 443 firms for the eBay v. Mercexchange case. For the RIM v. NTP
litigation outcome, I find that 198 of 439 firms (the portfolio was again filtered pending
available Compustat data for firms for later testing), or 48% of firms, had negative
CAR[0,1] effects. For the eBay v. Mercexchange Supreme Court decision, 279 out of 439
firms, or 64% of firms, had negative CAR[0,1] effects.
The null hypothesis is one of no event impact, meaning that only 50% of the
effects should be negative. MacKinlay and Filson and Oweis provide a test statistic to
assess significance, assuming that CARs are taken as independent random draws under
the null hypothesis (1997; 2010). This test statistic has a standard normal distribution
(Filson and Oweis 2010). This statistic takes the form:

[

]

√

Eqn. 3
where N- is the number of negative abnormal returns and N is the total number of
abnormal returns (MacKinlay 1997; Filson and Oweis 2010). The two statistics I
calculate are -0.64 (insignificant) and 5.68 (significant at 1%) respectively. Thus we can
reject the null for the eBay v. Mercexchange outcome but not for the RIM v. NTP one.
This, taken in combination with the insignificant CARs and positive [0.0] CAR for the
portfolio for the RIM v. NTP outcome, indicates several possibilities. Firstly, the media
and law review researchers could have over-inflated the importance of the RIM v. NTP
initial outcome as a landmark case for patent trolls. However, this seems rather unlikely
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given the legal evidence and post-RIM patent troll litigation trends. Next, it is possible
that market participants in 2003 did not understand the full implications of the RIM v.
NTP ruling—the media had yet to warm up to the sensationalism of patent trolls, so
perhaps information about the detriments of future patent troll attacks had not permeated
the market. In comparison, this situation had significantly changed by 2006. In fact, most
legal researchers began publishing on the subject of patent trolls in 2006 and 2007. Even
the 2003 FTC report on patent policy and innovation was published two months after the
RIM v. NTP August ruling. Finally, if this is not the case, then it is possible that the date
tested, August 5, 2003, represented a relatively insignificant step in the legal battle
between RIM and NTP. Perhaps the market attributes significance to other portions of the
legal back-and-forth (although preliminary testing for the 2006 settlement date as this
alternative suggests otherwise).
In any case, the eBay v. Mercexchange outcome revealed a statistically significant
sign test result over 50%, which coheres with my hypothesis. Perhaps further refinement
of the firm portfolio may yield higher sign testing results. Since firms were chosen on the
basis of NAICS code similarity with the litigated firms, there is a possibility that
unrelated firms that do not patent or that are not affected by patent troll behavior have
been included within the portfolio. Furthermore, it is possible that publicly-traded patent
troll firms themselves have been included in the portfolio. This is less likely, given that
the majority of patent trolls operate on a private basis (Abril and Plant 2007).
Since the eBay v. Mercexchange outcome yielded statistically significant results, I
further analyze the portfolio for the specific characteristics of firms impacted by litigation
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outcome events within the context of annual company R&D expense, net sales/turnover,
and market value. I do this by creating a dummy variable for the abnormal returns (1 if
negative, 0 if positive) of each firm in the sign test results. Next, I perform the variations
of the following OLS regression (linear probability model):

Eqn. 4
where Di is the dummy variable for abnormal returns from the sign testing results, αi, βi,
γi, and δi are parameters, RDi is R&D to Sales Ratio for the most recent annual data
available prior to May 2006, MVi is the market value in millions for the same time period,
and NDi is a categorical variable for NAICS codes (I regress at the two digit level of
specification in NAICS codes), and εi is the residual. My findings are summarized in
Table 7. The results indicate that market value is usually significant for negative
abnormal returns due to the litigation outcome, while R&D to Sales ratio is sometimes
significant. However, this model has significant shortcomings. The residuals from the
linear probability model are heteroskedastic, non-linear, and violate the normality of
errors assumption of the OLS regression, because the dependent variable is noncontinuous and can only take two values. In order to correct for this, I use a probit model
to calculate the significance of the independent variables mentioned above (see Eqn. 4).
The probit model does not make the OLS regression assumptions about the normality,
linearity, and homogeneity of variance of independent variables. Table 8 shows the probit
model results.
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The probit model likelihood ratio is statistically significant, meaning that the
model as a whole is also statistically significant against the null. The probit regression
coefficients give the change in the z-score or probit index for a one unit change in the
predictor, interpretation of the results is limited without further analysis. The probit
model indicates that R&D to Sales Ratios, Market Values, and NAICS codes at the 2nd
digit level of specification are significant. Perhaps this, taken in combination with the
OLS model results, may support my hypotheses that firms with higher R&D to Sales
ratios and smaller firms will be more adversely affected by the pro-troll litigation
outcomes. These hypotheses do not result in statistically significant results when tested in
sub-portfolios using the MacKinley factor model method mentioned above.
Conclusion
In conclusion, while the August 2003 event in the RIM v. NTP case did not seem
to significantly impact the market, the pro-troll Supreme Court ruling in eBay v.
Mercexchange did seem to significantly impact a proportion of firms in the market. After
conducting factor models tests and CARs analysis, as well as sign testing, OLS
regressions with binary dependent variables and probit model analysis, I find that for
firms that were affected by the 2006 eBay v. Mercexchange ruling, the decisive factors in
distinguishing affected vs. unaffected firms include the firm‟s R&D to Sales ratio, market
value, and NAICS code specification. The lack of statistically significant results for the
RIM v. NTP outcome that support my hypothesis may be due to the usage of the wrong
date, the lack of information regarding patent trolls in the market, or the lack of
significance of the outcome event to investors in the market.
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Further research is needed in grounding the theoretical work conducted thus far in
empirical research. Given the general lack of accessibility of patent data and litigation
data, researchers should seek to rely more on market statistics for publicly-traded firms.
Granted, this imposes a limitation on what can be studied—the behaviors of private
patent troll firms, as well as the smaller private firms that they prey upon, will not be
included in the data. However, given the general lack of research in this area of law and
economics, further event studies should yield interesting results to future researchers.
These studies could focus on distinguishing landmark litigation cases brought by patent
trolls vs. different types of NPEs, on quantifying the amount of welfare or private costs
lost by firms and consumers due to patent litigation, and on telling a historical story of
market impacts of patent troll litigation from its inception in the 1990s to the present.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics for Factor Models and CARs Testing for RIM v. NTP
# Observations per
# Firms
Portfolio

Firm

Mean

Min

Max

Std Dev

455

264

0.00

7.34

-0.85

0.06

1

264

0.00

0.27

-0.11

0.04

Litigated
Firm
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Table 2: Summary Statistics for Factor Models and CARs Testing for eBay v.
Mercexchange
#
Observations
# Firms
Portfolio

per Firm

Mean

Min

Max

Std Dev

444

264

0.00

3.12

-0.64

0.03

1

264

0.00

0.21

-0.09

0.02

Litigated
Firm
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Table 3: Summary Statistics for R&D to Sales Ratio and Market Value for RIM v.
NTP
#
Observation

Mean

Max

Min

Std Dev

s
Portfolio - R&D to Sales Ratio
Litigated firm - R&D to Sales Ratio

401

0.24

3.41

0.00

0.34

1

0.13

0.13

0.13

-

401

5167.12

293137.3
Portfolio - Market Value (mil $)

24592.8
2.54

0

4

Litigated firm - Market Value (mil
1
$)

1803.53

1803.53

1803.53

-
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Table 4: Summary Statistics for R&D to Sales Ratio and Market Value for eBay v.
Mercexchange
#
Observations
Portfolio - R&D to Sales Ratio
Litigated firm - R&D to Sales Ratio
Portfolio - Market Value (mil $)
Litigated firm - Market Value (mil $)

Mean

Max

Min

Std Dev

401

0.18

9.26

0.00

0.62

1

0.07

0.07

0.07

-

401

5029.49 147738.24

1 60688.79

4.78 17938.43

60688.79 60688.79

-
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Table 5: Factor Models and CARs Testing for RIM v. NTP
Variable

Portfolio

Litigated Firm

Eqn (1)

Eqn (2)

Eqn (1)

Eqn (2)

0.0017**

0.0013**

0.0013

0.0014

Constant

(.00055)

(.00029)

(.0022)

(0.0022)

Market excess return

0.98** (.036)

0.91** (.032)

1.32** (.15)

0.88** (.25)

Factor Model
Coefficients:

SMB (the small-minus-big Fama-French
factor)

0.89** (.054)

0.32 (.41)

factor)

0.36** (.070)

-.075 (.55)

UMD (the Carhart momentum factor)

-0.60** (.041)

-1.13** (.32)

# Observations

250

250

250

250

R-squared

.75

.93

.24

.27

HML (the high-minus-low Fama-French

Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs):
-0.0074
CAR[0,0]

0.00073 (0.022)

-0.19 (.023)

-0.092 (.21)

(.015)

CAR[0,1]

-0.014 (0.016)

-0.029 (.016)

-0.12 (.15)

-0.016 (.011)

32

-0.013
CAR[-1,1]

-0.019 (0.013)

-0.027 (.013)

-0.08 (.12)

(.0086)
-0.028

CAR[-3,3]

-0.032 (0.0085)

-0.031 (.0086)

0.16 (.078)

(.0056)

Note: ** denotes significance at 1%; standard errors in parentheses; covariances are 0
because the null assumes that consecutive observations are iid (Filson and Oweis 2010)
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Table 6: Factor Models and CARs Testing for eBay v. Mercexchange
Variable

Portfolio

Litigated Firm

Eqn (1)

Eqn (2)

Eqn (1)

Eqn (2)

0.00089**

0.00076**

-0.00032

0.000070

Constant

(.00024)

(0.00017)

(.0014)

(.0014)

Market excess return

0.94** (0.039)

0.73** (.035)

1.5** (.23)

1.60** (.29)

Factor Model
Coefficients:

SMB (the small-minus-big Fama-French
factor)

0.67** (.049)

-0.29 (.41)

factor)

-0.26** (.078)

-1.38* (.65)

UMD (the Carhart momentum factor)

-0.064 (.049)

-0.10 (.41)

# Observations

250

250

250

250

R-squared

.69

.86

.15

0.18

HML (the high-minus-low Fama-French

Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs):
CAR[0,0]

-0.012 (0.019)

-0.0081 (0.12)

-0.0061 (.042)

-0.014 (.046)

CAR[0,1]

-0.014 (0.013)

-0.010 (.0086)

-0.034 (.030)

-0.038 (.032)

CAR[-1,1]

-0.016 (0.011)

-0.012 (0.0070)

-0.031 (.024)

-0.040 (.026)

CAR[-3,3]

-0.032 (0.0072)

-0.024 (0.0046)

0.015 (.016)

0.013 (.017)

Note: ** denotes significance at 1%; standard errors in parentheses; covariances are 0
because the null assumes that consecutive observations are iid (Filson and Oweis 2010)
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Table 7: OLS Regression Models with Binary Dependent Variable for eBay v.
Mercexchange
Variable

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

.65** (.025)

0.67** (.029)

0.75** (.054)

0.061 (.04)

-0.022* (.013)

0.64**
Constant

(.028)

R&D to Sales

0.065

Ratio

(0.44)

Market Value (mil $)

-4.3E-06** (1.2E-

-4.9E-06** (1.5E-

06)

06)

0.061 (.043)
-5E-06** (1.5E06)

NAICS Code
# Observations
R-Squared

313 385
0.007 0.033

301

301

0.042

0.042

Note: ** denotes significance at 1%; * denotes significance at 10%; standard errors in
parentheses

36

Table 8: Probit Models for eBay v. Mercexchange
Variable

(1)

Constant

-6.14** (.57)

R&D to Sales Ratio

1.51* (.78)
-1.6E-11** (5.87E-

Market Value ($)

12)

NAICS=32

-4.90** (.92)

NAICS=33

-5.75** (.58)

NAICS=42

-6.28** (.74)

NAICS=45

-6.96** (.86)

NAICS=51

-5.94** (.59)

NAICS=52

-

NAICS=53

-5.37** (.85)

NAICS=54

-6.12** (.64)

NAICS=56

-

NAICS=62

-

NAICS=81

-

# Observations

301

Log Likelihood
(Convergence)

354.538

Likelihood Ratio (Chi2)

33.527**

Note: ** denotes significance at 1%; * denotes significance at 5%; standard errors in
parentheses

